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public.	 	 Indeed,	 the	disclosure	 system	 is	 designed	 to	 level	 the	playing	 field	 for	
issuers—	 addressing	 confidentiality	 concerns,	 for	 example.	 	 In	 addition,	 the	
system	 helps	 to	 promote	 confidence	 in	 the	 markets,	 which,	 in	 turn,	 enables	
growth	and	innovation	by	creating	access	to	capital	–	goals	important	to	issuers.		
Yet,	as	importantly,	the	system	also	protects	the	public	more	broadly.		After	all,	


























generally.5	 	When	directors	 do	 so,	 the	 resulting	discourse	 and	 candor	helps	 to	
ensure	the	purposes	of	disclosure	are	met.	
This	 article	 examines	 the	 purpose	 and	 regulation	 of	 this	 discourse,	
emphasizing	 the	 role	 of	 the	 board	 of	 directors	 and	 its	 attention	 to	 public	
stakehodlers	and	the	public,	with	a	particular	focus	on	omissions.		Omissions	occur	
when	 disclosures	 fail	 to	 include	 specific	 required	 information	 or	 when,	 for	
example,	 the	 disclosed	 information	 necessitates	 additional	 disclosures	 to	 be	






its	 responsibilities	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 purposes	 of	 securities	 disclosures	 and	
corporate	 discourse,	with	 a	 particular	 emphasis	 on	 omissions	 and	 candor,	 and	
deployng	some	case	studies	to	develop	the	theories	further.		Part	IV	analyzes	the	
relationship	between	directors,	disclosure	(and	 its	purpose)	and	omissions,	and	
publicness,	 tying	 the	 information-forcing-substance	 theory	 to	 director	





gatekeeping	 and	 explicating	 how	 it	 can	 result	 in	 more	 thorough	 disclosure	





	 The	 U.S.	 securities	 regime	 has	 a	 long	 and	 complicated	 history	 with	
mandatory	disclosure.		The	regulations	require	disclosures	both	at	the	issuance	of	
securities	 and	 over	 time,	 with	 a	 periodic	 system	 that	 addresses	 secondary	




In	 this	 sense,	 the	 regime	 deploys	 the	 information-forcing-substance	
theory.		The	premise	of	this	theory,	about	which	I	and	Professor	Langevoort	(along	
with	 others)	 have	 written,	 is	 that	 although	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 authors	 of	 the	
securities	 laws	 was	 to	 focus	 on	 disclosure,	 rather	 than,	 for	 example	 fairness,8	
various	 regulatory	 provisions	 create	 incentives	 for	 directors	 to	 engage	 in	 a	
dialogue	with	management	about	the	basis	for	any	disclosures,	and	to	do	so	prior	
to	engaging	in	discourse	with	shareholders,	stakeholders,	and	the	public.9		Thus,	
the	 statute	 drives	 behavior	 toward	 the	 collection	 and	 development	 of	
information,	 producing	 substantive	 behavior	 (discourse	 with	 officers	 and	
management	and	potentially,	changes	in	policies	and	procedures)	on	the	part	of	
















exists.	 	 This,	 in	 turn,	 supports	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 disclosure	 regime.	 Thus,	
securities	regulatory	goals,	disclosure	regulation,	and	substantive	choices	go	hand	
in	hand.			
The	 goal	 of	 the	 regulatory	 approach	 is	 to	 promote	 strong	 and	 healthy	
markets,	which,	in	turn,	enable	growth	and	innovation.11		To	achieve	that	goal,	the	
regime	charges	corporate	players	(for	our	purposes,	directors)	with	responsibility	

























The	 investor-protection	 goal	 is	 met	 on	 the	 front	 end	 with	 disclosure	
requirements	 that	 address	 both	 required	 disclosures	 and	 omissions.17	 	 This	
disclosure	 regimen	 is	paired	with	an	anti-fraud	 rule,	 the	enforcement	of	which	
plays	a	key	back-end,	investor-protection	role.18		When	taken	together,	the	result	
is	the	requirement	that	disclosures	may	not	be	misleading,	either	affirmatively	or	
through	omissions	or	half-truths.19	 	The	basic	premise	here	 is	 that	 fraud	 in	 the	
marketplace	 is	 costly	 and	 prohibiting	 and	 punishing	 it	 promotes	 market	
confidence.20		Truthful	and	appropriately	complete	disclosures	are	key	to	building	
investor	 confidence.21	 	 Thus,	 disclosures	 allow	 investors	 to	 make	 reasoned	
decisions	 confidently,	 trusting	 that	 they	 have	 the	 most	 accurate	 information	
available.22			















Others,	 52	 STAN.	L.	REV.	 87,	 117	 (1999)	 (explaining	 that	 both	 courts	 and	 SEC	 regulators	 require	
people	to	"volunteer	any	.	.	.	information	necessary	to	make	[their	statements]	not	misleading"	to	
avoid	 liability	 in	fraud-on-the-market	cases).	See	generally	Richard	Craswell,	Taking	 Information	
Seriously:	Misrepresentation	and	Nondisclosure	in	Contract	Law	and	Elsewhere,	92	VA.	L.	REV.	565	










Note	 that	 the	 disclosure	 regime	 does	 not	 prevent	 risky	 products	 from	
being	sold.		Indeed,	the	regulatory	choice	was	to	provide	investors	with	accurate	
information,	not	to	develop	a	regime	where	regulators	determined	the	merits	of	
the	 securities	or	entity.23	 	As	a	 result,	 regulators’	 role	—	even	when	 reviewing	
offering	 documents,	 for	 example	—	 is	 not	 to	 determine	 whether	 the	 issuer’s	
proposed	 business	 or	 products	 are	 “worthy.”	 	 Instead,	 the	 regulators	 review	
documents	 for	 sufficient	 disclosures,	 and	 then	 potential	 purchasers	 choose	
whether	to	invest.24		This	regulatory	choice	arguably	heightens	the	importance	of	
sufficient	and	complete	disclosures	as	well	as	a	concern	about	omissions.			 	
	 The	 “national	 public	 interest”	 referred	 to	 in	 Section	 2,	 however,	
encompasses	 not	 only	 investors,	 but	 also	 extends	 to	 issuers	 and	 the	 general	
public.	 Like	 investors,	 issuers	 perform	 more	 confidently	 in	 a	 robust	 and	 fluid	
market.25	To	that	end,	disclosure’s	purpose	is	to	address	information	asymmetries	











corporations,	 see	 Donald	 C.	 Langevoort,	Reflections	 on	 Scienter	 (and	 the	 Securities	 Fraud	 Case	
against	 Martha	 Stewart	 That	 Never	 Happened),	 10	 LEWIS	 &	 CLARK	 L.	 REV.	 1	 (2006);	 Donald	 C.	
Langevoort,	Resetting	the	Corporate	Thermostat:	Lessons	from	the	Recent	Financial	Scandals	about	
Self-Deception,	Deceiving	Others	and	the	Design	of	Internal	Controls,	93	GEO.	L.J.	285	(2004);	Mitu	
Gulati,	 Jeffrey	 J.	Rachlinski,	&	Donald	C.	 Langevoort,	Fraud	by	Hindsight,	 98	NW.	U.	L.	REV.	773	
(2004);	 Donald	 C.	 Langevoort,	 The	Organizational	 Psychology	 of	 Hyper-Competition:	 Corporate	
Irresponsibility	and	the	Lessons	of	Enron,	70	GEO.	WASH.	L.	REV.	968	(2002);	Donald	C.	Langevoort,	












beyond	 those	 facing	 investors.26	 As	 Professor	 Langevoort’s	 works	 reveal,	
corporate	Insiders,	like	officers	and	directors,	know	far	more	about	the	entity	than	
investors	 and	 the	 public,	 but	 they	 may	 lack	 appropriate	 incentives	 to	 ensure	
disclosure.27	 	 Addressing	 information	 asymmetries	 thus	 helps	 to	 put	 different	
companies	 on	 a	 more	 equal	 footing	 in	 the	 market,	 with	 the	 comparable	
information	allowing	investors	to	contrast	the	entities.28			
	 This	aspect	of	disclosure	has	at	least	two	roles.		First,	it	helps	to	level	the	
playing	 field	 between	 issuers	 by	 requiring	 all	 of	 them	 to	 provide	 similar	
information.		In	this	sense	the	disclosure	addresses	the	confidentiality	concerns	of	
issuers,	requiring	that	equivalent	information	be	shared	publicly.		Here,	then,	the	
disclosure	 regulation	 helps	 to	 address	 the	 concerns	 of	 corporate	 issuers	 that	
selective	disclosure	might	result	in	a	competitive	disadvantage.		In	that	sense,	the	
mandatory	 regime	 also	 addresses	 fairness	 concerns,	 which,	 along	 with	 those	
related	to	confidentiality,	might	otherwise	result	in	inadequate	issuer	incentives	
to	 disclose,	 a	 situation	which	 could,	 in	 turn,	 produce	 in	 suboptimal	 disclosure	
levels.	The	prohibition	on	material	omissions	also	plays	a	key	role	here,	ensuring	
that	 some	 issuers	 cannot	 take	 unfair	 advantage	 of	 their	 peers	 by	 omitting	 to	
disclose	certain	particulars.29		






































entity.	 	 Yet,	 shareholder	 owners	 suffer	 from	 the	 classic	 agency	 concerns	
implicated	by	the	distance	between	owners	and	operators.32		Of	course,	the	harm	
from	weak	or	bad	governance	extends	well	 beyond	 shareholders	 to	 the	public	
more	generally.		The	disclosure	regime	helps	to	police	this	space	in	at	least	two	







to	 the	 public	 through	 crooked	 promotion	…	 to	 bring	 into	 productive	 channels	 of	 industry	 and	









the	part	of	shareholders.33	 	The	result	 is	 the	facilitation	of	 issuer	capital	 raising	
and,	 in	 theory,	 the	 allocation	 of	 capital	 to	 the	 best	 issuers;	 thus	 creating	
substantial	 benefits	 for	 issuers	 as	 well.34	 	 Further,	 as	 discussed	 in	 Part	 III,	 the	
regulatory	structure	also	 inserts	directors	 into	the	disclosure	space,	demanding	
that	they	play	a	role	in	diminishing	information	asymmetries	and	detecting	fraud,	
which	helps	 to	decrease	shareholder	monitoring	costs,	 facilitate	capital	 raising,	
and	diminish	the	impacts	of	publicness.35		In	addition,	the	construct	of	publicness	
—	 explored	 more	 fully	 in	 Part	 IV	 —is	 important	 to	 discourse	 and	 disclosure	
because	it	connects	the	interaction	of	media,	analysts,	and	the	public	to	issuers’	
disclosure	choices.36	
	 As	 the	 2008-2009	 financial	 crisis	 and	 the	 accompanying	 slow	 recovery	
made	clear,	healthy	markets	are	key	to	growth.37		Disclosure	plays	a	role	here	as	
well.		The	disclosure	theory	posits	that	information	promotes	robust	capital	raising	

























produces	 an	 additional	 problem:	 	 the	 cost	 of	 capital	 increases.41	 	 When	 that	
happens,	in	theory,	investment	decreases.42		Those	decreases	in	investment	harm	
not	 just	 issuers,	but	also	stakeholders	such	as	employees,	as	well	as	 the	public	
more	broadly.		Thus,	disclosure	regulation	plays	a	powerful	role	on	the	front	end:	
it	helps	to	improve	accuracy	in	price	setting.		Better	pricing	helps	to	allocate	capital	



















44	 See	 e.g.,	 Adam	 C.	 Prichard,	 Self-Regulation	 and	 Securities	Markets,	 26	 REGULATION	 32	 (2003)	
(arguing	that	securities	exchanges	and	competition	should	play	a	more	significant	role);	John	C.	
Coffee,	 Jr.,	 Systemic	 Risk	 after	 Dodd-Frank:	 Contingent	 Capital	 and	 the	 Need	 for	 Regulatory	
Strategies	beyond	Oversight,	111	COLUM.	L.	REV.	795	(2011)	(arguing	that	contingent	capital	and	














that	 requires	 substantial,	 affirmative,	 truthful	 disclosures	 both	when	 an	 issuer	
offers	securities	to	the	public	and,	in	an	integrated	manner,	on	an	ongoing	basis.		
A	cornerstone	of	this	regimen	is	that	disclosures	cannot	be	so	carefully	calculated	





	 Half-truths	 and	 omissions	 have	 a	 daunting	 history	 in	 securities	 law	 and	
litigation,	and	Professor	Langevoort,	whose	work	we	celebrate	in	this	volume,	has	
thought	and	written	more	about	these	issues	than	any	other	scholar	of	corporate	
and	 securities	 law.49	 	 As	 Professors	 Langevoort	 and	 Gulati	 pointed	 out,	 the	
omissions	 doctrine	 is	 confused	 and	 limited	 by	 courts	 misunderstanding	 the	
difference	between	duty	(whether	disclosure	is	required)	and	materiality.50		This	






















Supreme	 Court	 granted	 certiorari,	 Leidos.51	 	 The	 allegations	 in	 Leidos	 involved	
omissions	 related	 to	 the	 cancellation	 of	 the	 issuer’s	 largest	 revenue	 source,	
contracts	with	 the	City	 of	New	York,	 due	 to	 fraudulent	 billing	 practices.	 Those	
issues	were	 not	 resolved	 because	 the	 parties	 settled	 the	 case	 just	 prior	 to	 its	
argument	and	filed	a	motion	to	remove	it	from	the	Court’s	calendar	and	hold	it	in	






In	 case	 any	 part	 of	 the	 registration	 statement,	 when	 such	 part	 became	
effective,	contained	an	untrue	statement	of	a	material	fact	or	omitted	to	state	
a	 material	 fact	 required	 to	 be	 stated	 therein	 or	 necessary	 to	 make	 the	
statements	 therein	 not	 misleading,	 any	 person	 acquiring	 such	 security	 ...	
may[]	sue.54	
	
As	 the	 language	of	 this	provision	makes	clear,	 there	are	 two	potential	 types	of	
liability.		The	first	clause	focuses	on	what	an	issuer	stated	affirmatively,	and	the	
second	on	what	the	issuer	did	not	say,	or	omitted.55		Section	11	does	not	require	

























for	 investors	and	for	the	public.	 	 In	addition,	the	regulatory	apparatus	not	only	
requires	an	extensive	array	of	specific	disclosures,	it	also	contains	a	requirement	




liability	 for	 misstatements	 and	 omissions	 in	 another	 offering	 document,	 the	























seller	 commits	 fraud	 in	 a	prospectus	or	 through	an	oral	 statement,	 and	 it	 also	
requires	privity.		Its	coverage	overlaps	to	some	extent	with	that	of	Section	11	,	and	
it	 like	 its	 Section	 11	 counterpart,	 this	 provision	 does	 not	 require	 reliance.		
Defendants	 do,	 however,	 have	 a	 defense	 that	 allows	 them	 to	 prove	 that	 they	
neither	knew	nor	 should	have	known	of	 the	untruth	or	omission.63	 	Again,	 the	
purpose	here	is	also	to	prevent	misleading	disclosures	in	the	offering	context	and	
thereby	protect	investors,	issuers,	and	the	public.	
	 The	 final	 provision	at	 issue	 in	 the	majority	of	 the	private-plaintiff	 class-







place	 in	 the	 securities	 litigation	 arsenal.65	 	 Moreover,	 in	 doing	 so,	 Congress	































as	 compelling	 as	 any	 opposing	 inference	 of	 nonfraudulent	 intent.”68	 	 Most	
importantly,	Section	10(b)	allows	for	issuer	liability	to	investors	for	misstatements	
and	omissions	 regardless	of	whether	 they	occur	 in	 an	offering	document,	 thus	
broadening	significantly	the	potential	scope	of	liability.69	
	 A	 key	 regulatory	 disclosure	 provision,	 Item	 303	 of	 Regulation	 S-K,	
Management’s	Discussion	and	Analysis,	presses	for	narrative	information	about	
the	company.70		In	particular,	Item	303	requires	information	about	known	trends	
and	 uncertainties.71	 	 The	 thrust	 of	 this	 requirement,	 of	 course,	 is	 that	 issuers	









70	 See	 Leidos,	 Inc.	 v.	 Indiana	 Pub.	 Ret.	 Sys.,	 137	 S.	 Ct.	 1395,	 1396	 (2017)	 (cert.	 granted).	 The	
defendants	 in	 the	Leidos	 case	argued	 that	 Item	303	does	not	create	a	cause	of	action.	Brief	of	
Petitoner	at	14,	Leidos,	Inc.	v.	Indiana	Pub.	Ret.	Sys.,	137	S.	Ct.	1395,	1396	(2017)	(cert.	granted).	








should	 share	what	 they	 know	 (or	 have	 reason	 to	 know)	 about	what	 is	 coming	
around	the	corner.72		As	Professor	Langevoort	has	so	aptly	put	it,	if	the	company	
has	had	three	great	quarters,	but	knows	that	the	bottom	is	about	to	fall	out	of	its	
business,	 a	 reasonable	 investor	 would	 find	 that	 information	 material	 to	 an	














		 Yet,	a	key	challenge	with	omissions	 is	 that	 there	 is	a	 temptation	by	any	
investor	harmed	by	a	purchase	to	argue	that	more	information	was	necessary	and,	
                                                
















therefore,	 omissions	 must	 have	 occurred.76	 	 As	 the	 saying	 goes,	 hindsight	 is	
twenty-twenty,	making	it	easy	to	argue	about	what	should	have	been	disclosed	








well	 be	different	 for	every	purchaser.	 Yet,	without	 reliance	as	an	element,	 the	
claims	are	arguably	easier	to	bring,	potentially	expanding	liability	dramatically.77		
As	 a	 result,	 courts	 have	 cabined	 potential	 claims	 such	 that,	 in	 order	 to	 trigger	
liability	for	an	omission,	the	alleged	misstatement	and	the	omission	must	pertain	
to	 the	 same	 subject	 matter,	 and	 the	 missing	 information	 must	 render	 the	
statement	misleading	by	altering	its	meaning.78	
This	concern	about	the	expansion	of	10b-5	claims	has	been,	and	continues	




















stronger	 and	 more	 likely	 to	 achieve	 real	 settlements.81	 Thus,	 many	 of	 the	
arguments	that	defendants	and	others	gnawing	at	the	omissions	doctrine	make	
about	the	strike-suit	nature	of	these	class	actions	have	arguably	been	tackled.82	
Additionally,	 omissions	 are	 actionable	 only	 if	 material,83	 but	 here	 the	
doctrine	is	subject	to	confusion.		The	confusion	stems,	in	part,	from	the	fact	that	
the	SEC’s	standard	for	materiality	in	the	MD&A	is	different	from	(and	lower	than)	




appropriate	 liability	provision	for	the	cause	of	action.	 	Thus,	 for	an	omission	to	
result	 in	 liability	 in	 a	 private-plaintiff	 class	 action,	 it	 must	 meet	 the	 requisite	
materiality	standard.85		This	standard	is	set	forth	in	TSC	v.	Northway:		whether	the	
omitted	 information	 “would	 have	 been	 viewed	 by	 the	 reasonable	 investor	 as	
having	significantly	altered	 the	 ‘total	mix’	of	 information	made	available.”86	 	 In	
short,	 if	 the	 market	 possessed	 the	 correct	 information,	 a	 false	 statement	 or	
omission	 will	 not	 be	 materially	 misleading.87	 	 Further,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 the	
misstatement	 in	 question	 involves	 speculative	 information,	 as	 is	 much	 of	 the	
information	contained	in	Item	303,	the	test	requires	balancing	the	probability	of	

















the	 event	 occurring	 along	 with	 the	 anticipated	 magnitude	 of	 that	 event.88		
Importantly,	 neither	 standard	 involves	 a	 bright-line	 rule	 or	 strict	 percentage	
approach.	 	 In	 fact,	 it	 is	well	 understood	 that	 any	 percentage	 deemed	material	
could	result	in	fraud	up	to	the	line,	and	that	a	definition	of	materiality	that	is	too	
stringent	would	result	in	the	wrong	incentives	and	the	potential	for	more	fraud.89	
The	courts	have	been	applying	 these	materiality	 standards	 for	decades,	
and	 they	 are	 quite	 straightforward	 –	 whether	 applied	 to	 affirmative	




an	 incentive	 to	 commit	 fraud	 through	 omissions	 and	 undermine	 the	 investor,	
issuer,	and	public	interest	protection	goals	of	disclosure.		It	would	also	diminish	
the	incentives	of	those	charged	with	ensuring	accurate	and	complete	disclosures	



























	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	 securities	 disclosures,	 candor	 presses	 on	 the	









                                                




















disclosure	 quality	 suffers.	 	 Obfuscation	 and	 complex	 sentences	 abound.		
Cageyness	increases.97		
Directors	are	arguably	situated	as	the	gatekeepers	of	disclosures	in	order	






	 The	 securities	 laws	 and	 regulations,	 along	 with	 various	 orders	 and	
statements	 from	 the	 SEC,	 emphasize	 that	 directors	 must	 actively	 engage	 in	
reviewing	 disclosures,	 thereby	 adding	 to	 the	 information-forcing-substance	
nature	of	the	securities	provisions.99		The	information-forcing-substance	theory	is	
part	 of	 the	 architecture	 of	 the	 Securities	 Act	 of	 1933.	 	 For	 example,	 as	 noted	
above,	Section	11	of	the	Securities	Act	provides	a	strict-liability,	express	cause	of	
action	 for	 misstatements	 and	 omissions	 in	 a	 Registration	 Statement.100	 	 The	
statute	 specifically	 includes	 directors	 as	 defendants.101	 	 They	 do	 have	 a	 due	
diligence	defense	available,	and	it	has	the	impact	of	making	the	claim	negligence-
like	(as	opposed	to	strict	liability	based)		in	nature.102				

























The	 statute	 also	 provides	 that	 directors,	 as	 parties	 named	 in	 the	








the	 defense	 is	 candor-focused,	 noisy,	 and,	 thereby,	 supports	 the	 purposes	 of	
disclosure.				
There	are	many	other	ways	in	which	the	regulatory	structure	has	evolved	
both	 in	 an	 information-forcing	 manner	 and	 where	 the	 role	 of	 directors	 is	
implicated.		Regulation	S-K,	of	which	the	MD&A	is	a	part,	is	a	classic	example.		As	
mentioned	in	Part	II	of	this	article,	the	MD&A	requires	information	about	known	
trends	 and	 uncertainties	 related	 to	 liquidity,	 capital	 resources,	 and	 results	 of	
operations.106		The	MD&A’s	purpose	is	to	provide	investors	with	a	narrative	that	
describes	 the	 business	 from	management’s	 perspective,	 indicating	where	 gaps	

















Item	 503.109	 	 Indeed,	 arguably,	 risk	 overlaps	 with	 all	 of	 the	 disclosures	 in	 the	






same:	 the	 reasonable	 investor	 and	 probability/magnitude	 for	 forward-looking	
information.114	 	 Liability,	 of	 course,	 is	 key	 to	 the	 information-forcing-substance	
theory	–	it	is	a	back-end	enforcement	mechanism	for	the	disclosure	regime	and	
                                                
107	S.E.C.	v.	Conaway,	698	F.	Supp.	2d	771,	818	(E.D.	Mich.	2010).		For	example,	Item	303	requires	



























(3)	 determine	 whether	 and	 how	 to	 disclose	 it,	 including	 ensuring	 sufficient	
disclosure;	and	(4)	disclose	the	information.116		Embedded	in	this	process	is	the	
concept	 of	 omissions.	 	 Regulation	 S-K	 directly	 addresses	 omissions	 with	 a	
requirement	that	any	disclosures	must	include	sufficient	information	so	as	not	to	
make	them	misleading.117		Here	again,	directors,	discourse,	and	candor	play	a	role.	





claim	 due	 diligence.119	 	 Accomplishing	 this	 requires	 candid	 discourse	 between	
directors	and	officers	and	between	directors	and	those	preparing	the	disclosures	
(experts	or	otherwise).		This	is	information-forcing-substance	in	action	with	one	
                                                
115	Omnicare,	Inc.	v.	Laborers	Dist.	Council	Const.	Indus.	Pension	Fund,	135	S.	Ct.	1318,	1332	(2015).	
See	 also	 Sale	&	 Langevoort,	 supra	 note	 2,	 at	 786;	Hillary	 A.	 Sale,	 J.P.	Morgan:	 An	Anatomy	 of	





















	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 statutory	 provisions	 that	 contribute	 to	 our	
understanding	 of	 disclosure,	 candor,	 and	 discourse,	 there	 are	 also	 SEC	
enforcement	 actions	 that	 implicate	 directors	 and	 their	 role	 in	 ensuring	 the	
purposes	of	disclosure	are	upheld.120		There	are	several	themes	running	through	
these	matters.		For	example,	directors	may	not	defer	too	much	to	insiders.121		They	
must	 meet	 regularly.122	 	 And,	 if	 they	 fail	 to	 follow	 through	 on	 requests	 for	
information	 to	 management,	 they	 are	 also	 likely	 to	 fail	 to	 meet	 their	
responsibilities	under	the	securities	laws.123	Further,	directors	who	know	officers	
are	 under	 investigation	 for	 criminal	 charges	 and	 fail	 to	 share	 this	 sort	 of	
information	with	shareholders	in	a	prompt	and	accurate	fashion	are	failing	in	their	
securities	monitoring	roles.124		Similarly,	directors	in	a	company	with	a	high	burn	
rate	 need	 to	 know	 if	 there	 are	 liquidity	 or	 credit	 freeze	 issues	 and,	 in	 some	
                                                
120	 See,	 e.g.,	 Report	 of	 Investigation	 in	 the	 Matter	 of	 Stirling	 Homex	 Corporation	 Relating	 to	
Activities	of	the	Board	of	Directors	of	Stirling	Homex	Corp.,	[1975-1976	Transfer	Binder]	Fed.	Sec.	
L.	Rep.	(CCH)	¶	80,219,	(July	16,	1975);	Report	of	Investigation	in	the	Matter	of	the	Cooper	Cos.,	







































‘red	 flags’	 that	 come	 to	 their	 attention.”129	 	 In	 addition,	 the	 SEC	 criticized	 the	
directors	for	failing	to	“establish	procedures	reasonably	designed	to	ensure	the	
accuracy	of	Incomnet’s	public	statements.”130		In	doing	so,	the	SEC	reiterated	the	
role	 that	 directors	 must	 play	 in	 ensuring	 that	 disclosures	 are	 complete	 and	


























when	 officers	 fired	 the	 company’s	 auditor	 for	 refusing	 to	 support	 reporting	
suspect	financial	results	and	information	reported	by	the	officers.132		According	to	
the	 SEC	 complaint,	 at	 least	 one	 of	 the	 directors	 knew	 of	 the	 underlying	 audit	
concerns,	but	“took	no	steps”	to	investigate	the	issues.133			The	SEC	accused	the	






several	 related	 party	 arrangements	 involving	 the	 CEO.135	 	 There	 are	 similar	
allegations	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 company’s	 restatements,	 with	 the	 SEC	
characterizing	the	director	as	“ignoring	red	flags	and	never	question[ing]	whether	
there	was	any	basis”	for	the	revisions.136			
	 At	 a	 minimum,	 a	 change	 in	 auditor	 should	 prompt	 clear	 and	 direct	
questioning	 and	 discussion	 (candid	 discourse)	 between	 directors	 and	
















management.137	 	 Indeed,	 in	 order	 to	 help	 prevent	 these	 sorts	 of	 shenanigans,	
management	 is	 no	 longer	 allowed	 to	 serve	 on	 the	 audit	 committee.138	 	 The	







tied	 to	 its	 projections	 was	 in	 jeopardy.140	 	 The	 amounts	 at	 issue	 were	 quite	





























the	 importance	 of	 its	 relationships	 and	 contracts	 with	 government	 agencies.		
Shortly	 after	 the	 City	 became	 aware	 of	 the	 fraudulent	 billings,	 the	 criminal	
investigations	began,	and	Leidos	began	to	lose	government	contracts.144	
	 According	to	the	plaintiffs,	the	directors	knew	about	the	misconduct,	the	






evidence	 to	 the	 contrary,	 the	 10-K,	 with	 the	MD&A	 included,	 did	 not	 provide	
information	 about	 Leidos’s	 fraudulent	 overbilling	 scheme,	which	was	 allegedly	
known	to	the	defendants	and	connected	to	a	significant	portion	of	its	projected	






discussed	 the	 issue	 at	 all,	 there	 was	 no	 need	 to	 clarify	 it	 with	 additional	
















information.149	 	 This,	 they	 argued,	 was	 a	 “pure	 omission,”	 in	 contrast	 to	 an	
omission	 required	 to	 make	 an	 affirmative	 disclosure	 not	 misleading.150	 	 This	
argument	is	specious	at	best	and	has	the	potential	to	gut	Item	303.		The	disclosure	
regimen	is	clear:		 if	the	revenue	source	was	key	to	the	company’s	growth,	Item	
303	 requires	disclosure	and	discussion.151	 	 Indeed,	 the	government’s	argument	













In	 particular,	 the	 plaintiffs	 alleged	 that	 internal	 documents	 contradicted	 the	



















disclosures	 in	 Exxon’s	 MD&A/S-K.	 	 In	 support,	 they	 argued	 that	 the	 issuer’s	
internal	 reports	 revealed	 that	 climate	 change	would	materially	 impact	 Exxon’s	
ability	fully	to	extract	its	hydrocarbon	reserves,	and,	thereby,	negatively	impact	its	
future	 business	 model.155	 	 The	 failure	 to	 include	 this	 information,	 which	 was		
directly	linked	to	the	information	disclosed,	undercuts	the	designated	role	of	the	
MD&A	“as	an	early	warning	device	intended	to	alert	investors	as	to	risks,	trends,	









Like	 Leidos,	 the	 Exxon	 case	 reveals	 both	 the	 link	 between	 disclosure	 and	
publicness,	and	the	role	of	directors	in	managing	publicness.		Recall	that	in	Part	I,	
we	 focused	 on	 the	multiple	ways	 in	which	 disclosure	 facilitates	 capital	 raising,	
issuer	parity,	investment,	and	efficient	markets.		When	coupled	with	enforcement	
and	litigation,	the	system	is	designed	to	increase	the	odds	of	a	strong	and	healthy	
market	 system	 --	where	 fraud	 is	 policed	 and	 punished	 and	 capital	 is	 allocated	
efficiently.158	 	 Although	 this	 system	 is,	 of	 course,	 important	 for	 investors	 and	

















public	perception	of	 the	company.	 	The	decisions	 that	 the	 issuer	and	 its	 inside	




requiring	thought	and	action	on	the	part	of	corporate	 insiders.	 	Moreover,	 it	 is	
about	both	what	is	disclosed	and	what	is	not.		It	is	also	about	how	those	choices	
impact	the	issuer,	investors,	markets,	and	the	public	more	broadly.			
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Exxon	 case,	 the	 climate-change	omissions	 resulted	 in	 a	 series	 of	 reactions	 and	
ongoing	rounds	of	media	coverage.		For	example,	shareholders	filed	claims	against	
the	company,	officers,	and	directors	for	securities	law	violations.163		Stakeholders,	
like	 scientists	 and	 states,	 reacted	 strongly	with	 concerns	 about	 the	 company’s	
failure	to	disclose	its	own	climate	change	concerns.164		The	SEC,	multiple	attorneys	
general,	 and	 various	municipalities	began	 to	 investigate	 the	 company	over	 the	
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2018,	 https://apnews.com/b89cf926eaf64ccebbeb314b905dd67b.	 Exxon	 employed	 a	 similar	
tactic	against	local	governments	that	sued	Exxon	for	damage	and	adaptation	costs	resulting	from	
climate	 change.	 Exxon	 has	 petitioned	 a	 Texas	 court	 to	 subpoena	 the	 California	 officials	 who	
brought	one	such	lawsuit,	alleging	that	these	officials	“are	defrauding	buyers	of	municipal	bonds	
by	 not	 disclosing	 to	 lenders	 the	 climate	 risks	 they	 have	 claimed	 in	 their	 lawsuits.”	 Stuart	
Leavenworth,	These	Communities	Sued	Big	Oil	Over	Climate	Change;	Then	 the	Backlash	Began,	












knew	about	 climate	 change	 and	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions.168	 	 They	 also	want	
documents	 concerning	 investor	 communications	 on	 climate	 change	 as	 well	 as	
communications	with	 groups	 associated	with	 “climate	 skepticism.”169	 	 In	 some	
cases,	 the	attorneys	 general	 involved	are	arguing	 that	 their	 states	 face	 serious	
costs	to	address	climate	change,	and	oil	companies	should	help	foot	the	bill.170	For	





ex	 ante,	with	 publicness	 in	mind.	 	 Indeed,	 both	 examples	 reveal	why	 ensuring	
complete	disclosures	matters.		Recall	that	the	purpose	of	these	disclosures	is	to	
protect	investors,	issuers,	and	the	public	as	well	as	to	ensure	fair	dealing	in	the	
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should	 be	 able	 to	 assume	 that	 the	 required	 relevant	 information	 has	 been	
disclosed	in	an	omission-free	manner.174			
Directors	have	 a	 crucial	 role	 to	play	here:	 	 developing	 candid	discourse	
within	the	corporation	before	the	disclosures	and	the	external	discourse	occur.		As	
Professor	 Langevoort’s	 work	 on	 behavioral	 theory	 in	 corporations	 reveals,	
directors	must	foster	open,	truthful	relationships	with	management	to	combat	the	
structural	 asymmetry	 that	 may	 increase	 managers’	 incentives	 to	 suppress	
negative	 information	about	the	day-to-day	operations	of	 the	corporation	when	
communicating	 with	 the	 board.	 175	 Those	 choices	 by	 management,	 of	 course,	




At	 issue	with	Wells	was	 its	 failure	 to	 tell	 shareholders	about	growing	 legal	and	
other	 issues.	 	Like	Leidos	and	Exxon,	the	plaintiffs	 in	the	Wells	 litigation	argued	
that	the	company	did	not	disclose	sales	practice	issues	in	its	SEC	filings.		Yet,	the	
“fake-accounts	scandal	 turned	out	 to	be	a	seminal	moment	 for	 [the	company],	
tarnishing	[its]	reputation	and	upending	its	management	team.176	













The	 role	 of	 the	 directors	 in	 this	 scandal	 has	 been	 the	 subject	 of	








The	 board	 should	 have	 caught	 this.	 	 And,	 as	 a	 result,	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	
instructed	 the	 board	 to	 “strengthen	 …	 oversight	 of	 the	 firm	 and	 senior	
management.”178			
Of	course	this	scandal	harmed	the	bank’s	shareholders.	 	Yet,	 like	in	 	the	
Leidos	 and	 Exxon	 situations,	 the	 harms	 extend	 beyond	 investors	 to	
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disclosure	 regimen	and	 insert	directors	 into	 it	 to	play	a	 key	gatekeeper	 role	 in	
ensuring	 the	 accuracy	 of	 disclosures,	 including	 pressure	 testing	 for	 omissions.		
Here	 is	 where	 discourse	 and	 candor	 come	 into	 play.	 	 They	 are	 part	 of	 the	
information-forcing-substance	 regime,	 which	 is	 a	 product	 of	 both	 federal	
securities	 laws	 and	 state	 fiduciary	 duties.	 	 When	 it	 works,	 it	 increases	 the	
accountability	of	management	and	the	directors	–to	investors,	to	the	markets,	and	
to	the	public	more	generally.181	 	 Indeed,	as	designated	securities	monitors,	 the	
regulatory	goal	is	for	directors	to	take	ownership	of	disclosures	by	engaging	with	
management	 and	 ensuring	 accuracy.182	 	 If	 they	 do	 so,	 they	 help	 to	 fulfill	
disclosure’s	 purpose.	 	 Yet,	 to	 do	 so	 effectively,	 directors	must	 both	 engage	 in	
discourse	and	understand	publicness	and	 its	potential	 impact	on	 the	company.		
They	must	 understand	 how	 their	 role	 connects	 to	 the	 entity’s	 boundaries	 and	
private	status,	as	well	as	 to	 its	public	obligations,	publicness,	and	social	 license	
more	 broadly.183	 	 Indeed,	 developing	 this	 understanding	 and	 engaging	 in	 the	
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